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detrimental for growth; fiscal consolidation promotes growth; and higher debt ratios are 
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endogenous debt ratio threshold of 59% can be derived. 
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The relevance of government debt for economic growth has become crucial, 
particularly in a context where policy makers have to face increasing fiscal imbalances. In 
terms of economic theory, at moderate levels of government debt, fiscal policy may induce 
growth, with a typical Keynesian behaviour. However, at high debt levels, the expected 
future tax increases will reduce the possible positive effects of government debt, 
decreasing investment and consumption resulting in less employment and lower output 
growth. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence that is currently available to shed light on 
the importance of government debt (and related aspects) for growth of productivity is not 
very conclusive. This paper attempts to fill some gaps and intends to provide some 
additional empirical evidence of the effects of government debt (and its maturity structure) 
on output growth and productivity for advanced countries (OECD) as well as emerging and 
developing countries. 
We have recently observed a revival in this theme fuelled by the substantial worsening 
of public finances in many advanced (and other) economies as a result of the 2008/09 
financial and economic crisis. In response, governments around the world implemented 
important fiscal stimulus. More than ever it is important to understand the effects of 
government debt on growth, capital accumulation and productivity, particularly when 
associated with financial crisis. 
The linkages between fiscal policy and growth have been the object of several analyses 
For instance, Gemmell (2004) has summarised many existing empirical work dividing it 
into three generation studies depending on the econometric methods used. Even though our 
main purpose is empirical in nature, it is worth referring to some initial theoretical 
contributions which serve as the underlying basis for our analysis. In particular, Modigliani 
(1961) and Diamond (1965) first, and later Saint-Paul (1992), take a theoretical approach 
based on a neoclassical growth model and suggest that an increase in public debt will 
always decrease the growth rate of the economy. Regarding the developments of 
government debt, Corsetti et al. (2010) discuss the importance of the reversal of significant 
fiscal imbalances, to ensure the curbing of government debt, notably in a context where 
monetary policy is limited by a zero lower bound regarding policy interest rates. 
With respect to the empirical evidence, most papers have focussed on advanced 
countries. Authors looking at mixed samples such as Schlarek (2004) focusing on a panel 
of 59 developing and 24 advanced countries for the period 1970-2002 concludes that, for 
developing countries, there is always a negative and significant relation between debt and 
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growth. For advanced countries, he does not find any robust evidence, suggesting that 
higher public debt levels are not necessarily associated with lower GDP growth rates. 
Checherita and Rother (2010) look at the Euro-area from 1970 to 2010 and find a nonlinear 
impact of debt on growth with a turning point at about 90-100% of GDP. On the same line, 
Kumar and Woo (2010) used 38 advanced and emerging countries from 1970 to 2007 and 
also find an inverse relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth, controlling 
for other determinants of growth.  
On the other hand, de la Fuente (1997) using OECD countries between 1965 and 1995 
report evidence of a sizeable negative externality effect of government on the level of 
productivity. In addition, Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002) for a sample of 19 OECD 
countries find that Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth and productivity of capital are 
weaker in countries with larger government (which can be proxied by the debt-to-GDP 
ratio).  
In this study we use cross-sectional/time series data for a panel of 155 developed and 
developing countries for the period 1970-2008. We do not present or test a comprehensive 
theory of economic growth. Rather, we are investigating the stability of coefficients over 
time and across countries (and groups of homogeneous economies). In the empirical 
estimation, the paper makes use of growth equations and growth accounting techniques (to 
explore different channels of impact) and focus on a number of econometric issues that can 
have an important bearing on the results. In particular, we assess such issues as 
simultaneity, endogeneity, the relevance of nonlinearities, and the importance of outliers. 
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by assessing the debt-growth nexus 
with a diversified variety of methods, providing sensitivity and robustness, and, in more 
specific terms, by addressing the following issues: i) The impact of government debt, and 
its maturity, on growth, the existence of nonlinearities, and the relevance of debt 
thresholds. ii) The relevance of financial development (e.g., banking sector development, 
stock market development, for which we build several financial development proxies) and 
the impact of financial crises (debt, currency and banking) on the debt-growth relationship. 
iii) On a growth accounting perspective, the impact on TFP growth (for that purpose we 
build a measure of TFP), capital stock accumulation, private and public investment. iv) 
Differences between country groups (OECD vs. Emerging and Developing). 
Our main results can be summarised as follows: 
i) there is a negative effect of the government debt ratio for the full sample; ii) a quadratic 
debt term is not statistically significant; iii) for the OECD, the longer the average debt 
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maturity the higher economic growth; iv) financial crisis are detrimental for growth, 
notably with high debt ratios; v) fiscal consolidation promotes growth in a non-Keynesian 
fashion; vi) for countries with debt ratios above (below) 90% (30%) the growth impact of a 
10% increase in the debt ratio is -0.2.% (0.1%); vii) an endogenous debt ratio threshold of 
59% can be derived for the full sample; viii) financial development, stock market 
development, financial efficiency and bond market development positively affect growth 
in the OECD; ix) higher debt ratios are beneficial to TFP growth, the growth of capital 
stock per worker, and detrimental to the levels of private and public investment; x) the 
higher the household’s debt burden coupled with higher government debt, the lower output 
growth; xi) most results are confirmed even after we address cross-sectional dependence. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the analytical and 
econometric methodology. Section three presents the data, in particular the construction of 
the TFP and financial development measures. Section four discusses our main results. 
Section five concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Analytical framework 
A neoclassical growth model provides the analytical framework for our analysis, and 
the underlying basic aggregate production function can be written as Y=F(L,K), with Y 
being the real aggregated output; L, labour force or population; K, capital (physical and 
human). This model suggests that poor countries should have a high return to capital and a 
fast growth in transition to the steady-state. However, there are several factors that could 
interfere with this result. Therefore, the standard growth model is based on a conditional 
convergence equation that relates real growth of per capita GDP to the initial level of 
income per capita,1 investment-to-GDP ratio (a proxy for physical capital in a standard 
neoclassical production function), a measure of human capital or educational attainment, 
and the population growth rate, which is augmented to include the level of government 
debt (as a share of GDP) – and some variants based on government debt maturity.2 This is 
complemented with some controls, one of which is a measure of trade openness,3 as 
_____________________________ 
1 The initial level of income per capita is not only a robust and significant variable for growth (in terms of 
conditional or beta convergence), but output is generally correlated with fiscal variables, in particular, tax 
revenues and government expenditures. 
2 The underlying model has its theoretical underpinnings from Landau’s (1983), Kormendi and Meguire’s 
(1985) or Ram’s (1986) formulations. 
3 If open economies are especially exposed to shocks, it may be especially important for the government to 
facilitate private consumption smoothing via countercyclical policies (Rodrick, 1998). On the other hand, 
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commonly found in the growth literature to expand the model beyond a closed-economy 
form. 
Ultimately, our aggregate production function is Y=F(L,K,D) with D being a debt-
related variable of interest. Specifically, D alternatively consists of the total government 
debt ratio; short-term government debt ratio; long-term government debt ratio; short-term 
government debt as a share of total government debt. The baseline specification assumes a 
linear relationship between D and growth: 
 itititit
j
ioititit Dxyyy ενηγββα ++++++=− − 101  (1)  
where 1−− itit yy represents the growth rate of real GDP per capita; 0iy is the initial value of 
the real GDP per capita;4 itjx , j=1,2 is a vector of control variables; itD  is a debt-related 
variable; tη  and iν correspond to the country-specific fixed effect and time-fixed effect, 
respectively, and itε  is some unobserved zero mean white noise-type column vector 
satisfying the standard assumptions. 0 1, ,α β β  and γ are unknown parameters to be 
estimated.  
The vector itx1  (benchmark) comprises population growth, trade openness, gross fixed 
capital formation (% GDP) and an education proxy for human capital corresponding to 
Barro and Lee’s (2010) secondary school attainment (in Tables 1 to 4.b). itx1  is enlarged 
with the debt maturity variable as well as an interaction term (in Table 4.c). Table 5 
includes as controls itx1  and four interaction terms with financial crises-related dummies. 
Table 6 uses alternatively itx 2 composed of the initial values of the variables included in 
itx1  (apart from population growth) together with the initial values (at the beginning of 
each 5-year period) for inflation (CPI-based), initial government size (see Appendix 2), 
initial financial depth (or liquid liabilities over GDP), banking crisis dummy and 
government balance ratio. Table 7 includes itx 2  together with a number of interaction 
terms with debt threshold levels and geographical dummies. Tables 11.a-b use itx 2  and 
Table 12 itx1 . 
To capture a possible non-linear relationship, we also consider a quadratic term in (1). 
Such specification would support, in this context, a so-called Laffer hypothesis if the 
coefficient on debt is positive and the coefficient on debt squared is negative. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
integrated international financial markets may offer more scope to absorb shocks through risk sharing, 
suggesting there is less need for governments to step in. For instance, Afonso and Furceri (2008) find that 
such risk sharing is lower among the EU countries than in the US states. 
4 For regressions using annual data, the lagged value of GDP( 1−ity ) is used instead. 
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we access the existence of other non-linear and threshold effects by making use of several 
dummy (binary-type) variables and interaction terms in our regressions, as it will be 
explained in the next section. 
Finally, taking a growth accounting approach, we compute a measure of TFP and we 
examine the influence of fiscal variables in affecting its growth rate, as well as the growth 
rate of per worker capital stock, and private and public investment levels. 
 
2.2. Econometric approaches 
2.2.1. Panel techniques 
The argument for cross-section studies over long time spans has been that less 
interesting short- to medium-term effects, such as business cycle effects, are thereby 
eliminated. However, a number of problems with cross-section studies using long time 
spans need to be addressed. The most important of these may be a potentially severe 
simultaneity problem. The cross-country regressions are usually based on average values 
over long time periods. In such cases, e.g., the level of government spending is likely to be 
influenced by demographics, in particular an increasing share of elderly. At the same time 
the share of elderly is correlated with GDP. Thus, errors in the growth variable will affect 
GDP, demographics and fiscal variables as a share of GDP, which are then correlated with 
the error term in the growth regression. 
A second problem is that cross-section studies using long observation periods give rise 
to an endogenous selection of government spending (tax) policy. For example, countries 
that raise taxes and experience lower growth during the observation period are more likely 
to change the policy stance afterwards and, for instance, reduce taxes, such as Ireland did 
during the 1980s. 
A third related problem is that cross-section analysis may be inefficient since it 
discards information on within-country variation. While both the simultaneity effect and 
the use of within-country variation are arguments in favour of panel regressions with 
shorter time spans, there are also risks. When the period of observation is short, it is less 
likely that the error in the growth regression will affect government debt and other 
regressors in the same period.  
Cross-section methods are simple and easy to interpret but relationships may be 
artificially created or obscured by unobserved heterogeneity and outliers. The use of panel 
data can overcome (some of) these problems, and has other advantages. As a compromise 
we focus mainly on combined cross-section time-series regressions using cumulative 5 
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year non-overlapping averages to smooth the effects of short-run fluctuations, even though 
growth regressions will be first estimated with annual data, therefore making use of the full 
informational advantage of our (unbalanced) dataset.  We run (pooled) Ordinary Least 
Squares to serve as a benchmark model – as common practice in the literature – despite 
being aware of all the econometric problems associated with this method, as previously 
discussed. We also run a within estimator, fixed effects, with the inclusion of time 
dummies that allow for common long-run growth in per capita GDP, which is consistent 
with common technical progress.  
 
2.2.2. Dealing with outliers 
A closer inspection of the data - next section - suggests that influential outliers could 
play an important role in cross-section analysis. The sample sensitivity of some cross-
country empirical studies is well known. Therefore, one advance in this paper over earlier 
work is the use of two robust estimators, the MM and the Least Absolute Deviation (LAD). 
The former fits the efficient high breakdown estimator proposed by Yokai (1987) which on 
the first stage takes the S estimator applied to the residual scale and derives starting values 
for the coefficient vectors, and on the second stage applies the Huber-type bisquare M-
estimator using iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRWLS) to obtain the final 
coefficient estimates.  
As for the LAD, it minimises the sum of squares over half the observations. One way 
of thinking about this informally is that the estimator seeks out part of the data for which 
the model has greatest explanatory power (as measured by the coefficient of determination) 
and then bases the parameter estimates on just that portion of the data. We then exclude 
any observations for which the LAD residual is more than two standard deviations from 
the mean residual, before re-estimating the model by OLS or FE. When the two sets of 
estimates are very different, then it may be that the observations are drawn from several 
different regimes, and/or the OLS (FE) estimates are driven by a few outliers. These 
procedures are not perfect, but should help to exclude the worst outliers, including some 
that would not be identified by more conventional OLS (FE) diagnostics.  
 
2.2.3. Endogeneity  
One should address possible endogeneity issues of right-hand side regressors. While 
country-specific fixed effects might capture some of the omitted variables (if we miss out 
an important variable it not only means our model is poorly specified it also implies that 
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any estimated parameters are likely to be biased)5, it does not solve the potential problem 
and one may end up estimating biased coefficient.  Moreover, panel data estimations may 
yield biased coefficient estimates when lagged dependent variables are included. In our 
case, initial income (or lagged income when using annual observations) is a regressor also 
present in the dependent variable, the rate of growth per capita GDP. Moreover, on the 
right-hand side of most estimated equations there is the debt-to-GDP ratio, which is itself a 
function of real output. It is quite possible that countries with higher growth potential can 
support a higher level of government debt. Furthermore, investment is also likely to be 
endogenous because the expectation of high growth usually induces higher investment 
levels. Therefore, we have re-estimated our regressions using the bias-corrected least-
squares dummy variable (LSDV-C) estimator by Bruno (2005).6  
Therefore, we complement our fixed-effects approach by estimating the main equations 
using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM), and to further inspect endogeneity issues 
we use a panel Instrumental Variable-Generalised Least Squares (IV-GLS) approach.7  
We estimate the growth equations by system-GMM (SYS-GMM) which jointly 
estimates the equations in first differences, using as instruments lagged levels of the 
dependent and independent variables, and in levels, using as instruments the first 
differences of the regressors. As far as information on the choice of lagged levels 
(differences) used as instruments in the difference (level) equation, as work by Bowsher 
(2002) and, more recently, Roodman (2009) has indicated, when it comes to moment 
conditions (as thus to instruments) more is not always better. The GMM estimators are 
likely to suffer from “overfitting bias” once the number of instruments approaches (or 
exceeds) the number of groups/countries (as a simple rule of thumb). In the present case, 
the choice of lags was directed by checking the validity of different sets of instruments and 
we rely on comparisons of first stage R-squares. Intuitively, the system GMM estimator 
does not rely exclusively on the first-differenced equations, but exploits also information 
contained in the original equations in levels. 
_____________________________ 
5 If our variables are uncorrelated with the omitted variables, then results may be unbiased. Thus, if we do not 
use any predictors that might be correlated with what we imagine to be an important omitted variable, we 
may be able to reduce the bias. That is why we do not wish to have too many variables in our model. If we 
use a predictor that is correlated with an omitted variable, we generate endogeneity bias. On the other hand, 
the more variables we consider the less likely it is that we are omitting something. 
6 Kiviet (1995)  uses asymptotic expansion techniques to approximate the small sample bias of the standard 
LSDV estimator for samples where N is small or only moderately large. Bruno (2005) extends the bias 
approximation formulas to accommodate unbalanced panels with a strictly exogenous selection rule. 
7 Where endogenous variables are instrumented by appropriate lagged levels and tested by looking at first-
stage regression estimates, as common practice in the literature. 
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2.2.4. Cross-sectional dependence 
We are aware of the potential issue (in particular, bias in coefficient estimates) that can 
arise from a significant cross-sectional dependence (within similar groups of countries in 
our sample) in the error term of the model. As put forward by Eberhardt et al. (2010), the 
so-called unobserved common factor technique relies on both latent factors in the error 
term and regressors to take into account the existence of cross-sectional dependence. 
Developed with the panel-date/time-series econometric literature over the course of the 
past few years, this method has been largely employed in macroeconomic panel data 
exercises (see, e.g., Pesaran (2004, 2006), Coakley et al. (2006), Pesaran and Tosetti 
(2007), Bai (2009), Kapetanios et al. (2009) and Eberhardt and Teal (2011 and references 
therein)). This common factor methodology takes cross-sectional dependence as the 
outcome of unobserved time-varying omitted common variables or shocks which influence 
each cross-sectional element in a different way. Cross-sectional dependence in the error 
term of the estimated model results then in inconsistent coefficient estimates if independent 
variables are correlated with the unspecified common variables or shocks.8  
With this in mind, we test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence Pesaran’s 
(2004) CD test statistic based on a standard normal distribution. We then run some of the 
most important regression equations with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. 
This non-parametric technique assumes the error structure to be heteroskedastic, 
autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the groups. Given the 
particular nature of the dependent variable and the possibility of error dependence another 
estimation approach would be worthwhile. We rely on the Pesaran (2006) common 
correlated effects pooled (CCEP) estimator, a generalization of the fixed effects estimator 
that allows for the possibility of cross section correlation. Including the (weighted) cross 
sectional averages of the dependent variable and individual specific regressors is suggested 
by Pesaran (2006, 2007, 2009) as an effective way to filter out the impacts of common 
factors, which could be common technological shocks or macroeconomic shocks, causing 
between group error dependence. 
 
_____________________________ 
8 There are different ways to account for such error cross-sectional dependences (see, e.g., Sarafidis and 
Wansbeek (2010) for an overview). 
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3. Building the dataset 
We investigate the relationship between government debt and real per capita GDP 
growth and TFP growth in a sample of 155 countries over the period 1970-2008. The 
dataset excludes countries with poor data collection, as measurement error is likely to be 
large. All variables are in logs with the exception of shares and growth rates. 
The dataset was collected from several sources.9 Real GDP per capita was retrieved 
from the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI); gross fixed capital 
formation (as share of GDP) was retrieved from the same source; public investment (as a 
share of GDP) was also taken from the same source together with AMECO for advanced 
countries; we constructed TFP based on data from the latest version 6.3 of the Penn World 
Table (PWT) of Heston et al. (2009) – see section below. The debt-to-GDP ratio comes 
from IMF’s debt historical database due to Abbas et al. (2010). 
With respect to human capital proxies we mainly rely on the average years of schooling 
of the population over 25 years old from the international data on educational attainment 
by Barro and Lee (2010), but we also take the literacy rate (% of people ages 15 to 24), 
primary school enrolment (% gross), primary school duration (years) secondary school 
enrolment (% gross), secondary  school duration (years), tertiary school enrolment (% 
gross) and tertiary school duration (years) from the WDI, for robustness purposes. 
As for other controls and variables most come from either the WDI or the IMF’s IFS, 
as follows: land area (in square kilometres), population, real interest rate (%), interest rate 
spread (lending rate minus deposit rate), imports and exports of good and services (BoP, 
current USD), labour participation rate (% of total), labour force, unemployment, total (% 
of total labour force), fertility rate (births per woman), age dependency ratio (% of working 
age population), urban population (% of total), short-term debt (% of exports of goods and 
services), terms of trade adjustment (constant LCU), real effective exchange rate index 
(2000=100), come from WDI. 
 
3.1. Growth accounting - Total Factor Productivity 
In order to assess how fiscal developments may impinge on TFP we construct a new 
dataset for this variable, for a large number of developed and developing countries, in the 
periods 1960-2007 and 1970-2007, depending on the availability of investment data for the 
period 1950-1960 and 1960-1970, respectively. Naturally, the TFP construction based on 
the latter period encompasses a larger number of countries. National income and product 
_____________________________ 
9 A summary table with definitions, acronyms and sources is presented in Appendix 2. 
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account data and labour force data are obtained from the latest version 6.3 of the Penn 
World Table (PWT) of Heston et al. (2009). We gathered the following variables: 
"rgdpwok" (real GDP per worker) and "Ky" (physical capital to output ratio). To construct 
the labour quality index of human capital (H), we take average years of schooling in the 
population over 25 years old from the international data on educational attainment (E) by 
Barro and Lee (2010). Annual data on years of schooling from 1960 up to 2000 were 
retrieved from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) dataset and then complemented with 
information up to 2007 using the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset together with linear 
interpolation methods. Appendix 1.a details the construction of the TFP variable. 
 
3.2. Financial development proxies 
We also chose to take a further step into combining different proxies of financial 
development, which will then be interacted with the debt variable in our regressions, by 
using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The conventional measures of financial 
development are based on Ross Levine’s database,10 on which the principal component 
analysis is applied (following Huang’s (2010) approach). See Appendix 1.b for a detailed 
description on how we constructed the different financial development proxies: overall 
financial development, financial intermediary development, stock market development, 
financial efficiency, financial size development and bond market development. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and graphical analysis  
Since we are largely interested in the relationship between growth (and TFP) and debt, 
it is instructive to aggregate our data into one big cross-section spanning from 1970-2008 
and analyse some scatter plots. Figure 1.a shows per capita real GDP growth against the 
ratio of government debt-to-GDP for the full sample. It seems that a negative relationship 
between the two variables can be extracted, attested by a linear fit. Figure 1.b looks at the 
OECD only but in this case, no clear relationship is found. Lastly, when taking the sub-
sample consisting of emerging and developing countries – Figure 1.c - we also find some 
evidence of a negative relationship. If one takes a quadratic fit instead (not shown), to 
account for a possible non-linear behaviour between debt and growth, the 95% confidence 
interval includes slightly more countries.  
[Figure 1] 
_____________________________ 
10 The description of these measures draws on Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996, 1999). 
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We find roughly a similar picture (not shown) when plotting the growth rate of TFP 
against the ratio of government debt-to-GDP  for the full sample and emerging and 
developing sub-sample, that is, a negative relation. However, our graphical representation 
suggests a positive relationship between TFP growth and the debt-to-GDP ratio for the 
OECD sub-sample (Figure 1.d). In addition, from the Kernel density estimates (Figure 2) 
we see that government debt has increased throughout time, which implies an increase of 
the size of the government notably when trying to provide the additional services related to 
the welfare state. 
[Figure 2] 
 
4.2. Results: government debt 
4.2.1. Debt-growth relationship 
We begin our analysis by estimating a growth regression using annual data, for the 
period 1970-2008, using as regressors the initial level of GDP, population growth, trade 
openness, private investment (gross fixed capital formation), education and government 
debt (our variable of interest). Results (not shown for reasons of parsimony) are in line 
with the growth literature, as we find significantly negative coefficients for the initial level 
of per capita GDP (conditional convergence hypothesis, confirming the catching-up 
process underlying a longer distance to the steady-state) and population growth, and 
significantly positive coefficients for trade openness,11 private investment and education 
levels. We will refrain from commenting on these results again for the remainder of the 
paper as they are generally consistent and robust throughout. As for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
evidence points to a statistically significant negative relationship with GDP per capita 
growth rates for the full sample (pooled OLS and outlier robust estimators).12  
In is important to acknowledge that private credit may bear a complementary 
relationship with government debt, notably in the context of economic growth. Therefore, 
we have included an interaction term between a measure of credit issued to the private 
sector by banks and other financial intermediaries (divided by GDP), excluding credit 
given to the government, government agencies and public enterprises, and government 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In Table 1 we still get statistically significant negative estimates of the 
_____________________________ 
11 This translates the successive openness process to international trade flows (removal of trade barriers and 
other sort of protectionism duties) by many countries, which has been intensified over the last few decades. 
12 Estimations with outlier-robust techniques don’t change qualitatively our main results. The observations 
excluded are: Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belize, Chad, Congo (Rep.), Gabon, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Malawi, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Paraguay, Qatar, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, Swaziland, Syria, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, UAE, Uruguay, Vanatu, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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debt-to-GDP ratio on output growth and, additionally, a negative coefficient for the 
interaction term, meaning that the higher the household’s debt burden coupled with higher 
government debt, the lower output growth will be. As a robustness exercise we have also 
estimated a model excluding the debt-to-GDP ratio, but explicitly including private credit 
and the interaction term between the two variables. Results (not shown) suggest that 
private credit by itself has a statistically positive effect on growth, however, the interaction 
term yields statistically negative coefficients for the all sample which are robust across 
econometric specifications (OLS, FE and SYS-GMM). The negative coefficient makes not 
only the effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio conditional on the level of private credit, but vice 
versa. In fact, it implies that private credit itself boosts growth given a low level of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. However, the negative coefficient on the interaction term has the 
interesting implication that there exists a threshold level of the debt ratio above which 
private credit can actually dampen growth. 
[Table 1] 
 
For the remainder of the paper we focus on 5-year averages, as common practice in the 
literature. Regarding the full sample we find evidence that an increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is detrimental to output growth and this is robust across econometric specifications, as 
reported in Table 2. 
[Table 2] 
Moreover, for the OECD sub-group, the same conclusion seems to apply when running 
pooled OLS (and the coefficient is now significant at 5% level). It is instructive to briefly 
discuss the size of the standardized coefficients – these indicate the relative importance of 
the variables included in the model: a big impact comes from the initial level of per capita 
GDP as well as from the population growth rate; private investment also accounts for a 
sizeable share; and the negative impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio is confirmed.  
In order to explore nonlinearities we re-run the same model with a quadratic-debt-term 
included as an additional regressor. Results (not shown) do not provide evidence of any 
significant quadratic-debt-term. As a robustness exercise, we have included also credit to 
the private sector in our 5-year averages dataset and the same conclusions as for the use of 
annual data apply. We have redone these estimations taking potential GDP growth as an 
alternative dependent variable.13 In particular, we took the smoothed or detrended GDP 
series extracted for each country making use of i) the Hodrick-Prescott, ii) the Baxter-King 
_____________________________ 
13 For reasons of parsimony results are not shown but they are available from the authors on request. 
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and iii) the Christiano-Fitzgerald random walk filters. Computing the growth rates of these 
new series and using them as alternative dependent variables, yields similar results. 
An interesting issue to explore is debt maturity, which we did using information from 
the World Bank.14 Table 3.a shows that when short-debt-to-GDP ratio is included in our 
growth specifications we still get a negative and statistically significant coefficient (for the 
full sample). The same applies when long-term debt is used instead.  
[Table 3.a] 
In addition, we also assessed the impact of short- and long-term debt, as shares of the 
total level of debt.15 In this case we obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
(at the 1% level) for the short-debt-to-total debt ratio across different econometric 
specifications (being the long-debt-to-total-debt the complement, it naturally yields a 
negative coefficient). 
Due to limitations in data retrieved from the WDI, we used the OECD’s own measure 
of average debt to maturity (in years) to construct additional dummy (binary type) 
variables. For the average maturity above 5 years we have classified it as long-term debt 
(dumlong) and attributed a value 1; the complement (short- and medium-term) takes the 
value zero. Table 3.b presents the results from these estimations. In only one case we find 
evidence supporting the claim that the higher debt maturity the higher the economic 
growth rate (specification 3). As for the interaction term it appears not to be significant. 
[Table 3.b] 
Financial crisis 
We now turn to a different, but equally important topic. In line with research by 
Afonso, Gruner, Kolerus (2010) on fiscal developments and financial crisis, we take the 
Laeven and Valencia’s (2010) database on banking, debt and currency crisis and study the 
relevance of these phenomena, when interacted with the debt-to-GDP ratio, in explaining 
differences in output growth. According to Easterly (2001), econometric tests and fiscal 
solvency accounting carried out in his paper confirm the important role of debt crises. 
Table 4 presents the results from adding govdebt_gdp with an interaction term for each type 
of crisis introduced one at a time, plus a dummy variable (available in the same dataset) 
taking the value 1 when a debt restructuring occurred and zero otherwise. The first aspect to 
notice is that govdebt_gdp retains its negative and statistically significant. We do find some 
evidence supporting the detrimental effect of financial crisis when associated with higher 
_____________________________ 
14 Given data availability a number of observations were lost due to data transformations. 
15 Results available upon request. 
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government debt-to-GDP levels on output growth, in particular those related to debt and 
currency crisis (robust across econometric methodologies). 
For the OECD sub-group (not shown) we loose statistical significance of the debt-to-
GDP variable entirely, but we retain statistically negative coefficients for most interaction 
terms with different types of crisis (in pooled OLS and FE cases; not in the SYS-GMM 
though). Moreover, we now have evidence of negative effects of both banking crisis and 
debt restructuring operations on per capita GDP growth. This seems to be in line with 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) finding that banking crises are typically accompanied by 
large increases in government debts. 
[Table 4] 
According to Gupta’s et al. (2005) study of 39 low income countries (during the 1990s) 
initial conditions also have a bearing on the nexus between fiscal variables and growth, an 
avenue is also explored by Kumar and Woo (2010). Therefore, we similarly include the 
initial government size (from Gwartney and Lawsson, 2006), in light of the robust results 
obtained by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).16 In addition, we include initial trade openness, 
initial financial depth (llgdp) and initial inflation (all averaged over each time period). A 
measure of banking crisis incidence is also considered as we have shown it is important 
determinant. The fiscal deficit is included to take into account the finding that fiscal 
deficits are negatively associated with longer-run growth (see, Fisher (1993) and Baldacci 
et al. (2004)).  
From Table 5 it stands out that banking crisis have indeed a negative impact on output 
growth which is robust across econometric specifications (as attested before). The budget 
balance is positive and statistically significant in four specifications for the OECD sample, 
which would imply that a fiscal consolidation promotes growth in a non-Keynesian fashion 
in those cases.17 As before, the debt-to-GDP ratio appears with negative and a significant 
coefficient for the whole sample and mostly insignificant for the OECD sub-group. As a 
robustness exercise we have repeated the analysis without initial conditions of the 
regressors previously included (apart from inigdppc) – hence, replaced with variables 
averaged over each 5-year period –, and results didn’t change.  
[Table 5] 
Another exercise worth while conducting is an assessment of the sensitivity degree of 
the different explanatory variables included in our regressions. We have re-run the 
_____________________________ 
16 Fiscal sustainability can also be a motivation, in line with Woo (2003) and Huang and Xie (2008). 
17 Afonso (2010) reports related evidence for the EU. 
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estimations without the budget balance (due to possible collinearity with either government 
debt or government size) and inflation (which proved not to be significant in the regression 
with initial conditions; but statistically negative in the first robustness exercise). Such 
additional findings confirm the negative effect to debt-to-GDP ratio for the full sample and 
for the OECD (the latter when running SYS-GMM).  
 
4.2.2. Debt thresholds 
High levels of government debt may affect the allocation of resources, hence growth 
and productivity. In this sub-section we study the effect of different debt-to-GDP ratio 
thresholds on growth. We followed Table’s 5 setting in terms of initial conditions of the 
regressors. In addition to govdebt_gdp included in each specification, we interact this 
variable with a dummy variable (dum30) taking the value 1 if the debt-to-GDP ratio was 
below 30 at a certain point in time, between 60 and 90 (dum3060) or above 90 (dum90), 
respectively. We find that the 30% debt threshold is positive and statistically significant at 
1 percent level in one pooled OLS, one FE, and SYS-GMM estimation for both the whole 
sample, and for the OECD sub-group. For the full sample having a debt-to-GDP ratio 
above 90 affects negatively growth.18 
In order to have a visual image, we plot the cross-sectional average of per capita GDP 
growth rates for these levels of debt-to-GDP ratios for the entire sample as well as the 
OECD and emerging economies sub-groups in Figure 3. Low debt is defined as having 
govdebt_gdp below 30% and high debt as a level above 90%. A consistent pattern is 
present, namely countries with low debt ratios grow faster (which is also true for the 
emerging sub-group). No significant difference is found with respect to OECD economies. 
[Figure 3] 
We also computed the impact on growth of a given proportional increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio. This was undertaken to allow an appropriate comparison of the impact of 
government debt on growth at different levels of debt and reflects the fact that an increase 
in the ratio from 10 to 20 percent constitutes a doubling, while an increase from 100 to 110 
percent raises it only by one-tenth. Table 6 summarizes the results for debt ratios in three 
groupings: <30%, 30-60% and > 90%. For each of these grouping we obtained the sample 
average debt ratio (row 1), and then multiplied a given increase (10%) in this ratio, by the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term (row 2, based on the different estimation 
_____________________________ 
18 Results available upon request. 
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techniques). The results (row 3) indicate that the higher the level of the debt ratio, the 
higher the negative impact on output growth. For instance, a 10 percent increase in the debt 
ratio in countries with debt ratio above 90 percent is associated with a decline in growth of 
0.27 percent, while an identical increase in the debt ratio in the 30-60 percent group is 
associate with a decline is growth around 0.08 percent. 
[Table 6] 
In Table 7 we run additional regressions with the debt ratio interacted with dummy 
variables taking the value 1 if the average debt ratio of a particular country over that 
country’s time span is above 60 (dumav60), above 65 (dumav65) until we reach the level 
of 100 (dumav100). For reasons of parsimony we only report the coefficients of interest 
and not the full set of estimates. The results show that for the whole sample, irrespective of 
the threshold level included in the regression, we always find the debt-to-GDP ratio having 
a negative and statistically significant effect on growth for the pooled OLS and SYS-GMM 
specifications. Similarly, for emerging countries we have the same result. Nothing can be 
said with respect to the OECD sub-group.19 The interaction terms in specification 1 (for the 
full sample) suggest that having average debt ratios above 60 further increases the adverse 
impact of debt on output growth. Indeed, we find interaction terms with statistically 
significant negative coefficients in 8 out of 9 regressions for the full sample. 
[Table 7] 
Endogenous debt threshold 
In the context of defining a plausible debt threshold level, other than specifying it in a 
purely ad-hoc way, we now explore the endogenous determination of the debt-to-GDP 
threshold ratio which is the threshold value in the empirical model that provides the best fit 
by maximizing its likelihood. Based on a reduced form growth equation allowing for the 
presence of multiple equilibrium (like in Strubhaar et al., 2002), we can employ Hansen’s 
(1996, 2000) techniques to a (generalized) threshold regression of the form: 
 01 11 0 211






y X if G
y y
y X if G
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ−
+ + → >
− =
+ + → <
 (2) 
where 2,1,0,, =jiijγ  are regression coefficients and γ is a threshold value that splits the 
sample in two halves. itX  is a vector of control variables consisting of population growth, 
_____________________________ 
19 If we re-run the estimations without initial conditions (not shown) little changes occur apart from the fact 
that i) we loose some significant coefficients for specification 1 (full sample) but ii) we gain some 
significantly negative coefficients with fixed-effects estimation in specification 4, and, more importantly, the 
OECD sub-group has a significantly negative coefficient in the debt-to-GDP ratio when govdebt*dumav95 is 
included as an additional regressor. 
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openness, education and investment. The main innovation of the empirical part is to 
estimate γ  endogenously and then split the entire sample accordingly (by examining 
whether a country performed better (over-performer) or worse (under-performer) than its 
country-specific growth projection). The threshold variable, G, will be the government 
debt ratio. 
Equation (2) has an econometric correspondence: a threshold regression model. This 
model estimation procedure involves three steps: i) estimating the sample split threshold 
value; ii) testing whether the endogenously determined sample split value is significant; 
and iii) performing conventional hypothesis tests.  






=γ  (3) 
where iq  is the value of the threshold variable (government debt) of region i, Q  is the set 
of all different values of iq  in the sample, γ is the estimated threshold value of iq , and 
)( iqe  is the vector of OLS residuals of the regression (2) if the sample is split in 
observations larger or smaller than iq , and each sample half is estimated separately.  
The significance of the sample split could be obtained from a conventional structural 
break test (Chow test). However, Davies (1977) argued that this test is invalid in the 
present context, because it assumes that the sample split γ  is known with certainty, while 
we estimate it endogenously. A Chow test would not take into account the estimation error 
of γ  and the uncertainty whether the threshold exists under the null hypothesis. Hansen 
(1996) suggests a Supremum F-, LM- or Wald-test, which has a non-standard distribution 
dependent on the sample of observations. The critical values can be obtained by a 
bootstrap. 
Estimating (2) with cross-sectional 5-year averages and with the annual samples 
(correcting for heteroskedasticity)20 yields an estimated threshold value γ =59.305 and a 
corresponding Supremum Wald-test of 27.89 whose p-value is 0.079, indicating a 
significant sample break for the full sample.21 
_____________________________ 
20 We thank Dieter Urban for kindly making his original code available, which was adaptated to our 
particular needs. 
21 Using the 5-year averages sample instead, we obtained a statistically significant  threshold for the debt-to-
GDP ratio of 58.8% (significant Supremum Wald-test of 76.6 with p-value of 0.016). Spliting the sample into 
OECD countries does not yield a significant debt threshold, but taking the narrower Euro-area sub-sample we 
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If we take the roughly 60% debt threshold just computed and attempt to summarize 
GDP growth based on this information we have in Figure 4 a visual representation that 
allows us to draw some meaningful conclusions. In particular, either picking the 60% debt 
threshold or the 3% budget deficit level, splitting the sample results in having countries 
with higher debt ratios, and higher budget deficits, associated with lower growth rates. On 




One additional issue to keep in mind when investigating the relationship between 
government debt and growth is the level of financial development. The negative impact of 
government debt on growth could conceivably be stronger in countries with more 
developed financial systems, translating, for example, a higher private debt stock and 
associated burdens (as already partly explored before with the inclusion of private credit). 
Therefore, we proxy financial development with different measures computed using 
PCA (see Appendix 1.b for the computation of these variables). As a first exercise, we run 
a regression including the previous set of initial regressors plus our overall measure of 
financial development (fd) and the latter interacted with the previously constructed 
dummies for the debt ratio threshold. In a second exercise, similarly to Table 7, we run 
independent regressions one at a time with a proxy for financial development and its 
interaction with the above 60% debt threshold, which we have computed as the 
approximate threshold level.22  
The evidence in Table 8 (panel a) suggests that those proxies and the interaction terms 
are statistically stronger in emerging countries. Results from the first exercise suggest that 
overall financial development has a positive effect on growth, but not when interacted with 
debt ratios, and the same is true for the OECD sub-group (according to the fixed-effects 
estimation). From the second exercise (Table 8, panel b), financial development, stock 
market development, financial size, financial efficiency, and bond market development 
essentially affect positively growth in the OECD sub-group. For emerging countries if the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is above 60% both the banking sector development and financial 
efficiency have a detrimental impact on output growth.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
find a debt threshold of 58.14% highly significant (at 1% level). Finally, for the emerging countries sub-
group a threshold of 79.11% was found for the debt-to-GDP ratio (significant at 1% level). 
22 Estimating this set of regressions with the outlier-robust MCD version of the newly computed financial 




4.3. Debt-TFP relationship: a growth accounting approach 
A detailed growth accounting exercise was also undertaken – based on the measures of 
TFP and capital stock per worker (see Appendix 1.a) – through which government debt 
influences growth. Table 9 presents panel regression estimates on the growth rate of TFP 
and capital stock per worker. Similarly to per capita GDP growth we find that the level of 
financial development affects positively both TFP and capital stock growth rates. While 
banking crises have a positive effect on TFP growth, they have a detrimental effect to the 
capital stock growth rate. Moreover, the budget balance appears with a negative coefficient 
for the OECD sample when explaining TFP growth but positive ones when explaining 
capital stock growth rates. Furthermore, the debt-to-GDP ratio has positive effects when 
considering both samples for TFP growth rates.  
[Table 9] 
Regarding the impact of debt ratios on private and public investment (not shown), our 
results suggest that banking crises and debt ratios have statistically significant negative 
effects in both cases. However, the impact of the budget balance is distinct: for private 
investment a higher debt ratio has a positive effect, whereas a higher debt ratio is 
associated with lower levels of government fixed capital formation.  
 
4.4. Cross-sectional dependence 
As discussed before, it is natural to suspect of the existence of cross-sectional 
dependence across homogeneous groups of economies. Therefore, we use Pesaran’s CD 
test (standard growth equation, with a basic set of controls, the debt ratio, and fixed effects) 
for the OECD and Euro-area sub-samples. We find statistics of 15.26 and 10.26; 
respectively corresponding to p-values of zero in both cases, rejecting the null hypothesis 
of cross-sectional independence.  
In Table 10 we run benchmark type growth regressions for the two sub-samples using 
either a Driscoll Kraay robust estimation approach or Pesaran’s Common Correlated 
Effects Pooled Estimator (CCEP). We examine three main variables of interest: debt ratio, 
the change of the debt ratio, and average debt maturity (using the OECD measure). 
Similarly to our earlier results, we find that government debt has a negative effect on 
growth for the OECD sub-group using Driscoll-Kraay robust estimation, but not under the 
CCEP approach. For both econometric methodologies we find negative effects on growth 
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associated with higher debt ratios. When running the CCEP estimator the debt maturity 
yields statistically significant positive coefficients, reinforcing our results in Table 3.b, 
which appeared to be weak.  
[Table 10] 
 
4.5. “Above” and “below” average performers vis-à-vis fiscal thresholds 
To gain additional insight on the relationship between fiscal developments and 
economic performance, we briefly review some country-specific details related to the 
regression results reported above (in particular the regression equation corresponding to 
specification 1 in Table 2). The main purpose of this exercise is to see if any definite trend 
can be observed with respect to government debt and budget deficits and the level of 
economic performance of the so-called “above-average performers” and “below-average 
performers” (countries), vis-à-vis the fiscal thresholds.  
For the full sample we identified above-average and below-average performing 
countries on the basis of the difference between their actual and predicted values of per 
capita GDP growth rates. In line with Nelson and Singh (1994) countries whose actual 
growth rates exceeded their predicted growth rates by 1% or more were classified as 
“above-average” performers, and countries that fell short of the predicted growth by a 
similar percentage (or more) were categorized as “below-average” performers. The list of 
countries in both categories is reported in Table 11. In both cases we run the regression 
using government debt-to-GDP ratios as the included fiscal variable of interest. The table 
shows the residual of the per capita GDP growth rate, the government debt ratio, and the 
budget balance ratio for these groupings of countries.  
[Table 11] 
From examination of the results in Table 11 there is no clear-cut or direct connection 
between these aggregates. In particular, we cannot conclude that the “above-average” 
performers (higher residuals in this case) have had necessarily lower debt ratios or budget 
deficits and that the “below-average” performers generally experienced larger debts and 
deficits. For example, we have “below-average” cases (negative residuals) with low levels 
of government debt and even budget balance surpluses. Conversely in the “above-average” 
category we find countries such as Israel with both a high debt ratio and a substantial 
budget deficit. If one isolates the group of OECD countries (not shown) we also have a 
mixed picture with, for instance, Greece being in the “above-average” category but with a 
debt ratio of 62.5% and a budget deficit of 8.1% of GDP. On the other hand, Finland is in 
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the “below-average” category although it has relatively small debt ratio (35.1%) and a 
budget deficit of 1.1% GDP. Still for OECD countries, the higher the computed residuals 
in absolute terms, the lower the debt-to-GDP ratio. The same is true for the budget balance 
in the “above–average” Performers: the higher the computed residuals, the higher the 
budget balance (or the lower is the deficit).  
Finally, and in order to summarise the overall effect of government debt on economic 
growth it is possible to build a density chart of all the statistically significant estimated 
coefficients, as depicted in Figure 5, where the left skewed plot confirms the global 




We have used cross-sectional/time series data for a panel of 155 developed and 
developing countries for the period 1970-2008, in order to assess the potential linkage 
between fiscal policy developments and economic growth. More specifically, we used 
growth equations and growth accounting techniques and focussed also on a number of 
econometric issues that can have an important bearing on the results, notably, simultaneity, 
endogeneity, the relevance of nonlinearities, and threshold effects. 
Our empirical results confirm the negative effect of the government debt ratio for the 
full sample in our dataset. This result is robust across econometric methodologies and the 
inclusion of different sets of regressors. We don’t find evidence supporting a Laffer-type 
relationship, as a quadratic debt term was found to be statistically insignificant. Moreover, 
when taking debt maturity into account it differs whether one has short or long-term debt 
as percentage of GDP or as percentage of the total debt level. In the first case, we get 
statistically negative coefficients for both the short- and long-term debt across different 
econometric specifications for the full sample. Using the second definition, we find that 
short-term debt positively affects growth. For the OECD sub-group only, we have the 
result that the longer the average maturity of government debt the higher growth will be. 
Using the IMF’s database on financial crisis we confirm their detrimental effect of 
growth, but that is further worsened if interacted with high debt-to-GDP ratios. When the 
budget balance is included in the equation to be estimated we consistently get positive 
coefficients, which implies that, in those cases, a fiscal consolidation promotes growth in a 
non-Keynesian fashion. In addition, the higher the household’s debt burden coupled with 
higher government debt, the lower output growth. 
 23
With respect to the analysis of different government debt thresholds, countries with 
debt ratios above 90% of GDP are associated with lower economic growth rates when 
compared with countries that maintained an average debt ratio below 30% of GDP over the 
period under scrutiny. In particular, for the latter group, the growth impact of a 10% 
increase in the debt ratio is 0.1% whereas for the former group of countries that effect 
amounts to -0.2%. Using Hansen’s endogenous determination of the threshold debt ratio 
we find that, for the full sample we get a value of 59% of GDP, more specifically 58% of 
GDP for the Euro area, and for emerging countries a slightly bigger value of 79% of GDP.  
Regarding the level of financial development when interacted with government debt-
to-GDP, our results show that it positively affects growth in the OECD sub-group, and the 
same is valid for stock market development, financial efficiency and bond market 
development (after controlling for the debt-to-GDP ratio set at 60%).  
On a growth accounting perspective, higher debt ratios are beneficial to TFP growth, 
and for the growth of capital stock per worker, whereas they are detrimental to the levels of 
private and public investment. The budget balance appears with positive contributions for 
the TFP growth, capital stock growth and private investment. Finally, most results are 
confirmed even after we account for cross-section dependence. 
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Appendix 1.a Growth Accounting - TFP 
For human capital (H), we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (2005) in giving a larger weight to more educated workers: 
                               ))(exp( EH φ=  (A1) 
where E is the average years of schooling; and the function φ(E) is piece linear with slope 
of 0.134 for 4≤E , 0.101 for 84 ≤< E  and 0.068 for E<8 . The wage of a worker with E 
years of education is proportional to her human capital. Since the wage-schooling 
relationship is widely believed to be log-linear, this would imply that H and E would have 
a log-linear relation as well, such as exp( * )H Eφ= . International data on education-wage 
profiles (Psacharopoulos, 1994) suggests that in Sub-Saharan Africa the return to one extra 
year of education is about 13.4%, the world average is 10.1% and the OECD average is 
6.8%. We estimate the capital stock, Ky, using the perpetual inventory method: 
                       1)1( −−+= ttt KyIKy δ  (A2) 
where tI  is the investment and δ  is the depreciation rate. Data on tI  are from PWT 6.3 as 
real aggregate investment in PPP. We estimate the initial value of the capital stock ( 0Ky ), 
in year 1950 as )/(1950 δ+gI  where g is the average compound growth rate between 1950 
and 1960, and δ is the depreciation rate (set to 7% for all countries and years).  
We construct two different measures of TFP: one for a smaller sample of countries, 
which have investment data from 1950 onwards and TFP figures go from 1960 till 2007, 
and another, larger sample, for countries which have investment data from 1960 onwards 
and TFP figures go from 1970 till 2007. TFP was then based on a Cobb-Douglas aggregate 
production function of the type αα −= 1)(HLAKY , following the neoclassical tradition, 
where α =capital-income share, K=physical capital, H=human capital, L=labour input and 
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A=TFP. After some mathematical manipulations (dividing both sides by L, taking logs and 
time derivatives and rearranging) TFP is computed according to the equation below (with a 
capital-income share 3/1=α )23: 
 ])*exp(.)*/[( )1( αα ϕ −= ititititit HrgdpwokKyrgdpwokTFP . (A3) 
 
Appendix 1.b Financial Development Proxies 
The first measure, Liquid Liabilities (llgdp), is calculated as the liquid liabilities of 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (currency plus demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities) over GDP. The second indicator, Private Credit (pcrdbofgdp), measures general 
financial intermediary activities provided to the private sector. The third one, Commercial-
Central Bank (dbacba), proxies the advantage of financial intermediaries in channelling 
savings to investment, monitoring firms, influencing corporate governance and 
undertaking risk management relative to the central bank.  
Efficiency measures for the banking sector: Overhead Costs (overhead), the ratio of 
overhead costs to total bank assets; and the Net Interest Margin (netintmargin), the 
difference between bank interest income and interest expenses, divided by total assets.24  
Indices for stock market development: Stock Market Capitalization (stmktcap), the size 
index, is the ratio of the value of listed domestic shares to GDP. Total Value Traded 
(stvaltraded), the ratio of the value of domestic shares traded on domestic exchanges to 
GDP, can be used to gauge market liquidity on an economy-wide basis. Turnover Ratio 
(stturnover) is the ratio of the value of domestic share transactions on domestic exchanges 
to total value of listed domestic shares.25 Finally, we consider two bond market 
capitalization measures as ratios to GDP, private (prbond) and public (pubond). 
Following Huang (2010), we combine the above financial measures as follows: 1) 
Overall financial development, 1st principal component of pcrdbofgdp, llgdp, dbacba, 
overhead, netintmargin, stmktcap, stvaltraded and stturnover; 2) Financial intermediary 
development, 1st principal component of pcrdbofgdp, llgdp and dbacba; 3) Stock market 
development, 1st principal component of stmktcap stvaltraded and stturnover; 4) Financial 
_____________________________ 
23 Since consistent data of factor income shares are difficult to obtain for individual countries, most empirical 
papers assume that income shares are identical across time and space. Gollin (2002) provides strong evidence 
supporting this assumption, which is also consistent with the Cobb-Douglas function approach. Moreover, 
Bernanke and  Gürkaynak (2001) find no systematic tendency for labour shares to vary with real GDP per 
capita or the capital-labour ratio nor a systematic tendency to rise or fall over time, and most estimated labour 
income shares lie between 0.6 and 0.8. For our own purposes we take it to be equal to 2/3. 
24 Lower overhead costs and net interest margins frequently indicate greater competition and efficiency. 
25 A high value of the turnover ratio indicates a more liquid (and potentially more efficient) equity market. 
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efficiency development, 1st principal component of overhead, netintmargin, stvaltraded 
and stturnover; 5) Financial size development, 1st principal component of llgdp and 
stmktcap; 6) Bond market development, 1st principal component of prbond and pubond. 
The 1st principal component is normalized in such a way that high values indicate 
higher financial development. The first standardized index, overall Financial Development, 
can be written as:26 
0.67 * 0.45* g 0.28* 0.16* 0.25* int arg
0.81* 0.84* 0.33*
fd pcrdbofgdp ll dp dbacba overhead net m in
stmktcap stvaltraded stturnover
= + + − − +
+ + +
 
In addition, the 1st principal component explains 79% of the total variance in the 
standardized data. Nevertheless, given our outlier discussion and the fact that PCA is based 
on the classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers, we take one further step. 
This drawback is easily solved by basing the PCA on a robust estimation of the covariance 
(correlation) matrix. A well suited method is the Minimum Covariance Determinant 
(MCD) that considers all subsets containing h% of the observations (generally 50%) and 
estimates ∑  (the variance) and µ  (the mean) on the data of the subset associated with the 
smallest covariance matrix determinant. We implement Rousseeuw and Van Driessen’s 
(1999) algorithm to estimate new measures for the previously created aggregated proxies. 
After re-computing the same measures with the MCD version we obtain similar results. 
Moreover, the pair wise correlation coefficients between the 12 different proxies range 





















26 A likelihood ratio test was used to examine the “sphericity”case, allowing for sampling variability in the 
correlations. This test comfortably rejects sphericity at the 1% level with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy equal to 0.753. 
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Appendix 2 – Variables and sources 
Variable Definition/Description Acronym 27
real GDP per capita  Gdppc 1/
gross fixed capital formation (% GDP)  Gfcf_gdp 2/ 
public investment (% GDP)  Pubinv_gdp 2/ 3/
Total Factor Productivity Variable constructed using growth accounting techniques Tfp 4/ 
Government budget surplus or deficit 
(% of GDP)  
The government budget surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP. Govbal_gdp 5/ 
Central Government Debt (% GDP)  Govdebt gdp 6/
School attainment average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old from 
the international data on educational attainment Edu 7/ 
literacy rate (% of people ages 15 to 
24) 
 Literates 2/ 
primary school enrolment (% gross)  Primary_enrol 2/
primary school duration (years)  Primary_dur 2/
secondary school enrolment (% gross)  Secondaru_enr
ol 
2/
secondary  school duration (years)  Secondary dur 2/
tertiary school enrolment (% gross)  Tertiary enrol 2/
tertiary school duration (years)  Tertiary dur 2/
land area (in square kilometres)  Land area 2/
population   Pop 2/
imports and exports of good and 
services (BoP, current USD) 
 Imp, exp 2/
labor participation rate (% of total)  Lfp 2/
labor force  Laborf 2/
unemployment, total (% of total labor 
force) 
 Unemp 2/
fertility rate (births per woman)  Fertility 2/
age dependency ratio (% of working 
age population) 
 Depratio_wa 2/
urban population (% of total)  Urban pop 2/
Short-term debt (% of exports of goods 
and services) 
 Short_debt_gdp 2/
terms of trade adjustment (constant 
LCU) 
 Terms_trade 2/





One of the major indicators to measure the size, relative to the 
economy, of financial intermediaries, including three types of 
financial institutions: the central bank, deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions. It is calculated as the liquid liabilities of banks 
and non-bank financial intermediaries (currency plus demand and 
interest-bearing liabilities) over GDP.
llgdp 8/ 
Private Credit is defined as the credit issued to the private sector by banks and other 
financial intermediaries divided by GDP excluding credit issued to 
government, government agencies and public enterprises, as well as 
the credit issued by the monetary authority and development banks. It 
measures general financial intermediary activities provided to the 
private sector.
pcrdbofgdp 8/ 
Commercial-Central Bank is the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank 
and central bank assets. It proxies the advantage of financial 
intermediaries in channelling savings to investment, monitoring 
firms, influencing corporate governance and undertaking risk 
management relative to the central bank.
dbacba 8/ 
Overhead Costs is the ratio of overhead costs to total bank assets. overhead 8/
Net Interest Margin equals the difference between bank interest income and interest 
expenses, divided by total assets. A lower value of overhead costs and 
net interest margin is frequently interpreted as indicating greater 
competition and efficiency.
netintmargin 8/ 
Stock Market Capitalization the size index, is the ratio of the value of listed domestic shares to 
GDP. stmktcap 8/ 
Total Value Traded as an indicator to measure market activity, is the ratio of the value of 
domestic shares traded on domestic exchanges to GDP, and can be 
used to gauge market liquidity on an economy-wide basis.  
stvaltraded 8/ 
Turnover Ratio is the ratio of the value of domestic share transactions on domestic 
exchanges to total value of listed domestic shares. A high value of the 
turnover ratio will indicate a more liquid (and potentially more 
efficient) equity market.
stturnover 8/ 
Private bond market capitalization  prbond 8/
Public bond market capitalization  pubond 8/
Banking crisis Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a banking crisis occurred and 
zero otherwise Bankcrisis 9/ 
Debt crisis Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a debt crisis occurred and zero 
otherwise Debtcrisis 9/ 
Currency crisis Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a currency crisis occurred and 
zero otherwise Currencycrisis 9/ 
Debt restructuring Dummy variable taking the value 1 if a debt restructuring took place 
and zero otherwise debtrestru 9/ 
 
1/ World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI). 2/ WDI, 3/ AMECO.  4/ version 6.3 of the Penn World Table  
PWT) of Heston et al. (2009). 5/ WDI, IMF IFS, Easterly (2001). 6/ IMF (Abas et al., 2010). 7/ Barro and Lee (2010). 8/ 





Table 1: Growth equations, annual data – different estimation methods and samples 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Real GDPpc growth 
OLS (pooled) OLS-LAD MM FE-within DIFF-GMM SYS-GMM 
Sample 1970-1990 1990-2008 All OECD All All All OECD All OECD All OECD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
gdppc(-1) -1.31** -0.59*** -0.71*** -0.71** -0.75*** -0.56*** -3.54*** -1.64** -8.98** -3.35 -1.00*** 0.05 
 (0.549) (0.130) (0.122) (0.286) (0.131) (0.095) (0.898) (0.797) (3.659) (3.277) (0.308) (2.817) 
popgr -1.41** -0.65*** -0.74*** -0.56* -0.86*** -0.89*** -1.01*** -1.40*** -1.10* -2.21 -0.77*** -2.07 
 (0.569) (0.134) (0.134) (0.322) (0.117) (0.088) (0.320) (0.476) (0.607) (1.918) (0.256) (3.074) 
openness -0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.02* 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.049) (0.028) (0.010) (0.010) 
gfcf_gdp 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.12** -0.00 0.32** 0.15*** 0.01 
 (0.072) (0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.019) (0.017) (0.029) (0.047) (0.107) (0.160) (0.036) (0.163) 
education 0.02 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.18*** -0.04 0.04** -0.02 
 (0.027) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.061) (0.041) (0.017) (0.058) 
govdebt_gdp 0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.04** 0.01 -0.03*** -0.02 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.045) (0.010) (0.039) 
credit*debt -0.03 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.032) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) 
Standardized Coeff.             
inigdppc -0.36 -0.25 -0.26 -0.18 -0.34        
popgr -0.31 -0.21 -0.22 -0.13 -0.28        
openness -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.03        
gfcf_gdp 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.26        
education 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.15        
govdebt_gdp 0.02 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.21        
credit*debt -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.01 -0.06        
Obs. 236 1,141 1,598 429 896 1,598 1,598 429 920 249 1,598 429 
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00        
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.26  0.14 0.18     
Hansen (p-value)         0.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)         0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 
AB AR(2) (p-value)         0.05 0.43 0.04 0.61 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS (OLS-pooled), OLS with Least Absolute Deviation robust version (OLS-LAD), MM estimator a la Yohai (1987) which efficiently makes uses of both the S and Huber-type M estimators using iteratively reweighted 
least squares (IRWLS), Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV-C), Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Two-Step robust Difference GMM (DIFF-GMM) and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter two methods lagged 
regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The standardised 
coefficients show the change of a standard deviation of GDPpc growth due to a one standard deviation change in a variable of interest. The F-test p-value reports the test on the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the 
instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons 











Table 2: Growth equations, 5-year averages data – different estimation methods and samples 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Real GDPpc growth 
OLS OLS-LAD MM LSDV-C FE-within IV-GLS SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All All All All OECD All OECD All OECD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
inigdppc -0.55*** -0.60*** -0.97*** -0.52*** -0.82*** -5.05*** -5.22*** -2.90*** -4.17*** -2.66*** -0.30 -2.72 
 (0.125) (0.227) (0.258) (0.118) (0.095) (0.510) (0.619) (0.467) (0.541) (0.422) (0.308) (2.927) 
popgr -0.36*** -0.02 -0.37** -0.41*** -0.68*** -0.37** -0.37 -0.59 -0.37* -0.54* -0.31* 1.03 
 (0.111) (0.191) (0.165) (0.111) (0.217) (0.174) (0.226) (0.390) (0.220) (0.308) (0.181) (0.750) 
openness 0.00 0.01*** 0.01 0.00 0.00* 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.02 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.024) 
gfcf_gdp 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.13** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.21*** -0.00 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.040) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.042) (0.049) (0.031) (0.039) (0.042) (0.230) 
education 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.032) 
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.042) 
Standardized Coeff.             
inigdppc -0.25 -0.25 -0.32 -0.25         
popgr -0.14 -0.006 -0.18 -0.17         
openness 0.03 0.19 0.08 0.027         
gfcf_gdp 0.33 0.25 0.36 0.32         
education 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.16         
govdebt_gdp -0.23 -0.13 -0.15 -0.24         
Obs. 982 217 204 967 982 964 982 217 918 210 982 217 
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00         
R-squared 0.21 0.20 0.31 0.22   0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25   
Hansen (p-value)           0.20 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)           0.00 0.06 
AB AR(2) (p-value)           0.86 0.53 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS (OLS-pooled), OLS with Least Absolute Deviation robust version (OLS-LAD), MM estimator a la Yohai (1987) which efficiently makes uses of both the S and Huber-type M estimators using iteratively reweighted 
least squares (IRWLS), Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV-C), Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Panel IV-GLS estimation and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter two methods lagged regressors are used as 
suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The standardised coefficients show the change of 
a standard deviation of GDPpc growth due to a one standard deviation change in a variable of interest. The F-test p-value reports the test on the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for 
over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated 




Table 3.a: Growth equations with short-debt-to-GDP and long-debt-to-GDP ratios, 5-year averages data – different estimation methods 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Real GDPpc growth 
OLS OLS-LAD MM LSDV-C FE-within IV-GLS SYS-GMM 
Sample All 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
inigdppc -0.55*** -0.85*** -0.49*** -0.79*** -0.81*** -1.05*** -6.92*** -6.94*** -6.40*** -6.68*** -4.22*** -4.86*** -0.68 -0.72* 
 (0.184) (0.188) (0.178) (0.181) (0.147) (0.148) (0.770) (0.657) (0.778) (0.806) (0.740) (0.765) (0.477) (0.412) 
Popgr -0.38** -0.38** -0.49*** -0.51*** -1.11*** -0.98*** -0.48** -0.48** -0.24 -0.37 -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 -0.35 
 (0.169) (0.159) (0.168) (0.160) (0.169) (0.259) (0.190) (0.214) (0.245) (0.270) (0.168) (0.179) (0.174) (0.243) 
Openness 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.03** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
gfcf_gdp 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.054) (0.050) (0.029) (0.030) (0.045) (0.044) 
education 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) 
shortgovdebt_gdp -0.04***  -0.04**  -0.05**  -0.00  -0.00  -0.04***  -0.05***  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.013)  (0.016)  
longgovdebt_gdp  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.01***  -0.02***  -0.01***  -0.02*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Standardized Coeff.               
inigdppc -0.15 -0.24 -0.14 -0.24           
popgr -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.17           
openness 0.004 0.03 -0.03 -0.0005           
gfcf_gdp 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34           
education 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.16           
shortgovdebt_gdp -0.10  -0.09            
longgovdebt_gdp  -0.24  -0.25           
Obs. 629 594 620 585 629 594 616 585 629 594 529 493 629 594 
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00           
R-squared 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.24     0.28 0.32 0.27 0.29   
Hansen (p-value)             0.91 0.89 
AB AR(1) (p-value)             0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)             0.29 0.57 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS (OLS-pooled), OLS with Least Absolute Deviation robust version (OLS-LAD), MM estimator a la Yohai (1987) which efficiently makes uses of both the S and Huber-type M estimators using iteratively reweighted 
least squares (IRWLS), Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV-C), Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Panel IV-GLS estimation and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter two methods lagged regressors are used as 
suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The standardised coefficients show the change of 
a standard deviation of GDPpc growth due to a one standard deviation change in a variable of interest. The F-test p-value reports the test on the joint significance of the regressors. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for 
over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated 






Table 3.b: Growth equations with debt average maturity plus dummy interactions, 5-year averages 




OLS FE-within IV-GLS SYS-GMM 
Sample OECD
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
inigdppc -0.81*** -0.72** -6.05*** -5.93*** -4.48** -4.97** -0.63 -0.56 
 (0.304) (0.313) (1.569) (1.934) (2.158) (2.054) (0.887) (0.473) 
popgr -0.06 -0.16 -2.78*** -2.38*** -1.97*** -2.01*** 0.41 0.52 
 (0.258) (0.279) (0.718) (0.527) (0.745) (0.692) (0.756) (1.731) 
openness 0.01** 0.01** 0.09** 0.11** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.01 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.049) (0.029) (0.030) (0.006) (0.008) 
gfcf_gdp 0.06 0.06 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.21 0.35** -0.03 0.01 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.080) (0.071) (0.146) (0.167) (0.133) (0.131) 
education -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.016) 
debtavtermmat 0.01  0.33*  -0.02  -0.02  
 (0.057)  (0.184)  (0.148)  (0.164)  
govdebt_gdp  -0.00  0.02**  0.02***  -0.02 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.021) 
govdebt_gdp*dumlong  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Standardized Coeff.         
inigdppc -0.35 -0.31       
popgr -0.01 -0.04       
openness 0.19 0.17       
gfcf_gdp 0.15 0.14       
education -0.04 -0.03       
debtavtermmat 0.01        
govdebt_gdp  -0.06       
Obs. 93 93 93 93 66 66 93 93 
F-test (p-value) 0.00 0.00       
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.44 0.30 0.36   
Hansen (p-value)       1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)       0.77 0.99 
AB AR(2) (p-value)       0.72 0.92 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS (OLS-pooled), Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Panel IV-GLS estimation and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). 
For the latter method lagged regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The standardised coefficients show the change of a standard 
deviation of GDPpc growth due to a one standard deviation change in a variable of interest. The F-test p-value reports the test on the joint significance of the regressors. 
The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of 
first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it 





 Table 4: Growth equations with debt and financial crisis, 5-year averages data – different estimation methods 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Real GDPpc growth 
FE(within) IV-GLS SYS-GMM 
Sample All 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
inigdppc -5.22*** -5.29*** -5.13*** -5.28*** -5.33*** -4.17*** -4.08*** -3.83*** -4.04*** -4.11*** -0.52 -0.41 -0.54 -0.37 -0.12 
 (0.619) (0.694) (0.722) (0.711) (0.698) (0.541) (0.566) (0.567) (0.559) (0.570) (0.575) (0.474) (0.535) (0.489) (0.625) 
popgr -0.37 -0.56** -0.57** -0.57** -0.57** -0.37* -0.54** -0.54** -0.56** -0.56** -0.18 -0.61 -0.69* -0.68 -0.88 
 (0.226) (0.273) (0.278) (0.265) (0.278) (0.220) (0.231) (0.232) (0.220) (0.237) (0.370) (0.438) (0.376) (0.415) (0.549) 
openness 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) 
gfcf_gdp 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.060) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.055) 
education 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.042) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) 
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
govdebt_gdp*bankingcrisis  -0.01     -0.00     -0.00    
  (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.005)    
govdebt_gdp*debtcrisis   -0.02***     -0.02***     -0.02***   
   (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.006)   
govdebt_gdp*currencycrisis    -0.01***     -0.01***     -0.01***  
    (0.004)     (0.004)     (0.003)  
govdebt_gdp*debtrestruct     -0.00     0.00     0.01* 
     (0.003)     (0.003)     (0.004) 
Obs. 982 876 876 876 876 918 826 826 826 826 982 876 876 876 876 
R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26      
Hansen (p-value)           1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)           0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)           1.00 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.78 
Note: The models are estimated by Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Panel IV-GLS estimation and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc 
growth, as identified in the first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 






Table 5: Growth equations with initial conditions, 5-year averages data – different estimation 
methods and samples 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Real GDPpc growth 
OLS Fixed-Effects (within) FE-LAD IV-GLS SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD All OECD All OECD All OECD All OECD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
inigdppc -0.14 -0.98*** -4.18*** -3.15** -3.95*** -3.15** -4.23*** -3.16*** -0.45 -1.58* 
 (0.095) (0.311) (0.959) (1.465) (0.931) (1.465) (0.801) (1.201) (0.458) (0.930) 
iniedu 0.68 -1.28 0.42 1.20 0.43 1.20 0.37 1.23 3.86* 4.55 
 (0.767) (2.096) (0.684) (1.575) (0.674) (1.575) (0.689) (1.951) (2.106) (3.902) 
iniinf 0.002*** -0.00 0.001*** -0.00 0.003*** -0.00 0.002*** -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.029) 
inigovsize 0.04 0.09 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.34** 0.31 -0.32 -0.22 
 (0.090) (0.115) (0.169) (0.196) (0.174) (0.196) (0.174) (0.198) (0.344) (0.308) 
inifindepth 0.35 -0.31 2.65** 0.24 2.71* 0.24 2.32** 0.23 -0.38 2.64 
 (0.409) (0.458) (1.332) (1.195) (1.375) (1.195) (1.022) (1.012) (3.029) (1.760) 
initrade 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) 
bankcrisis -1.24*** -1.45*** -1.30*** -1.12** -1.32*** -1.12** -1.39*** -1.12** -2.70** -2.21* 
 (0.392) (0.541) (0.369) (0.489) (0.360) (0.489) (0.346) (0.525) (1.063) (1.340) 
govbal_gdp -0.01 0.13*** 0.05 0.10* 0.06 0.10* 0.04 0.10** 0.08 0.05 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.048) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049) (0.080) (0.105) 
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.03** -0.02 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.014) 
inigfcf 0.04 0.02 -0.05* -0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.05* -0.12* 0.19** 0.11 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.032) (0.069) (0.032) (0.069) (0.032) (0.062) (0.084) (0.130) 
Obs. 370 129 370 129 362 129 355 127 370 129 
R-squared 0.13 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.27 0.37   
Hansen (p-value)         0.20 1.00 
AB AR(1) (p-value)         0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) (p-value)         0.07 0.42 
Note: The models are estimated by pooled OLS, Within Fixed Effects (FE-within), Fixed Effects Least-Absolute Deviation method (FE-LAD) and Two-Step robust 
System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the 
first row. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the 
instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no 
autocorrelation), respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of 




Table 6: Impact on real GDP growth per capita of a 10 % increase in the debt ratio 
 
 Initial debt ratios (% GDP) 
 <30 30-60 >90 
Sample average of govdebt 14.644 46.542 116.565 
Regression coefficient, average(1) 0.067 -0.017 -0.023 
Growth impact of 10% increase in govdebt from sample average(2) 0.098 -0.079 -0.268 
 
Note: (1) average of the estimates (from OLS, FE, SYS-GMM) on the coefficients of interaction terms between initial debt-to-GDP and dummy variables for four 
categories of levels of initial debt-to-GDP (below 30%, between 30 and 60%, between 60 and 90% and above 90% of GDP) for the entire sample period. The results are 
based on coefficients statistically different from zero. However, the statistical significance of the coefficients varies across estimations. (2) this estimate of growth impact 





Table 7: Growth equation with different levels of Government Debt plus initial regressors, 5 year 
averages data – different estimation methods and samples 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDPpc growth 
 
OLS (pooled) Fixed-Effects (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Included one at a time          
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02** -0.02 -0.03* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.020) (0.014) 
govdebt*dumav60 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02* 0.00 -0.03 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.056) (0.012) (0.014) (0.023) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.53 0.26 0.38 0.38    
govdebt_gdp -0.01*** -0.00 -0.03* -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02** -0.01 0.01 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.036) (0.009) (0.022) (0.000) 
govdebt*dumav65 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.05 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.058) (0.012) (0.013) (0.000) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.27 0.39 0.38    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02* -0.03 0.01 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.036) (0.010) (0.029) (0.000) 
govdebt*dumav70 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.058) (0.013) (0.029) (0.000) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.38    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02* -0.03 0.01 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.011) (0.028) (0.000) 
govdebt*dumav75 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.058) (0.014) (0.024) (0.000) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.38    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.036) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020) 
govdebt*dumav80 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.07*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.066) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.37    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02** -0.03 0.03 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.036) (0.011) (0.028) (0.020) 
govdebt*dumav85 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.07*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.066) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.37    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02** -0.03 0.03 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.036) (0.011) (0.028) (0.020) 
govdebt*dumav90 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.07*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.066) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.37    
govdebt_gdp -0.02*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02** -0.03 0.03 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.036) (0.011) (0.028) (0.020) 
govdebt*dumav95 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.07*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.066) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.37 0.37    
govdebt_gdp -0.01*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.02* -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.038) (0.012) (0.028) (0.031) 
govdebt*dumav100 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.12*** -0.01 0.02 -0.04*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.029) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016) 
Obs. 288 129 73 288 129 73    
R-squared 0.21 0.32 0.53 0.27 0.37 0.45    
Note: The models are estimated by OLS, Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are 
used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. For the first panel dumav30, dumav3060 and dumav90, are 
binary dummy variables taking the value 1 if the average debt-to-GDP ratio of a particular country over the sample’s time span is below 30%, between 30 and 60% or 
above 90%, respectively. For the second panel, we also take the average value of the debt-to-GDP ration for each country as the threshold level, but now dumav60 refers 
to having that average ratio above 60%. Mutatis mutandis for the remaining levels. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below 
each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond 














Table 8: Growth equation with different levels of government debt plus initial regressors and 
proxies for financial development, 5-year averages data – different estimation methods and 
samples 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDPpc growth 
 
OLS (pooled) Fixed-Effects (within) SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg All OECD Emerg 
(a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
fd -0.01 0.14 3.29* 1.07 3.30*** -4.74** 1.40 -5.56 3.68 
 (1.068) (1.530) (1.764) (0.773) (1.002) (1.844) (3.199) (7.482) (0.000) 
fd*dumav30 -0.87 -0.46 -7.71*** -0.72 -2.97*** 14.05 -1.34 4.97 6.13 
 (1.124) (1.633) (1.971) (0.720) (0.963) (12.937) (3.320) (8.699) (0.000) 
fd*dumav3060 0.03 -0.00 -5.00** -0.26 -1.98* 2.86 -1.27 5.20 0.79 
 (1.069) (1.598) (1.827) (0.752) (1.035) (3.397) (3.367) (7.857) (0.000) 
fd*dumav90 -0.13 -1.77 -4.13** -0.50 -1.25 2.56 -0.81 7.25 -3.87 
 (1.387) (2.038) (1.985) (2.049) (2.383) (35.745) (3.205) (9.593) (0.000) 
Obs. 127 80 36 127 80 36 127 80 36 
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.75 0.55 0.70 0.61    
Included one at a time  (b)          
fd -0.37 -0.07 -2.36*** 0.67*** 1.00*** -0.22 0.03 0.42 0.32 
 (0.223) (0.285) (0.622) (0.224) (0.362) (2.643) (0.767) (0.900) (2.330) 
fd*dumav60 0.26 -0.28 2.61** 0.14 1.48 -3.81 0.13 -1.21 0.09 
 (0.782) (1.311) (1.038) (0.840) (1.143) (2.564) (1.300) (1.799) (2.739) 
Obs. 127 80 36 127 80 36 127 80 36 
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.66 0.54 0.68 0.60    
fbank -0.25 0.54 -0.66 0.52 0.35 4.60* -0.67 -0.28 0.21 
 (0.321) (0.390) (1.244) (0.621) (0.846) (2.227) (1.263) (2.118) (1.281) 
fbank*dumav60 -0.10 -0.57 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 -4.68** -0.03 -0.15 -6.22 
 (0.411) (0.529) (1.621) (1.048) (1.268) (2.103) (0.880) (1.390) (7.006) 
Obs. 181 102 41 181 102 41 181 102 41 
R-squared 0.23 0.33 0.63 0.38 0.48 0.77    
fstock -0.17 0.08 -1.59** 0.67** 0.72** 1.47 -0.64 0.01 6.26 
 (0.221) (0.261) (0.634) (0.271) (0.268) (1.927) (0.854) (1.190) (0.000) 
fstock*dumav60 0.49 0.12 1.71 1.41 0.49 -2.67 0.40 0.40 -6.52 
 (0.673) (1.123) (1.069) (1.119) (0.988) (3.446) (1.216) (1.920) (0.000) 
Obs. 146 87 41 146 87 41 146 87 41 
R-squared 0.24 0.32 0.66 0.47 0.53 0.68    
feff -0.87** -1.60*** -0.32 -0.28 1.19* -0.81 -1.00 -0.81 -1.91 
 (0.352) (0.448) (1.198) (0.659) (0.605) (1.533) (3.858) (1.011) (5.956) 
feff*dumav60 0.34 1.04 -0.41 -0.59 -0.80 -8.92** 0.37 1.13 -1.24 
 (0.626) (0.821) (3.345) (1.818) (2.058) (3.904) (1.863) (1.604) (5.431) 
Obs. 133 81 36 133 81 36 133 81 36 
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.55 0.48 0.60 0.63    
fsize -0.40 0.01 -2.17*** 1.77** 1.72* 2.53 -0.30 1.30 -0.17 
 (0.280) (0.388) (0.696) (0.771) (0.880) (4.892) (1.326) (1.670) (0.000) 
fsize*dumav60 -0.17 -0.59 1.49 1.50 0.63 -4.13 0.91 -1.88 1.88 
 (0.909) (1.565) (1.155) (1.473) (1.383) (4.175) (2.128) (4.350) (0.000) 
Obs. 144 87 41 144 87 41 144 87 41 
R-squared 0.25 0.32 0.69 0.48 0.54 0.69    
fbond -0.56 0.22 -5.38*** 2.17** 2.58*** -16.79*** -1.63 0.86 0.55 
 (0.557) (0.590) (1.721) (0.935) (0.788) (3.757) (2.007) (2.831) (10.461) 
fbond*dumav60 0.13 -0.36 8.82 -0.96 0.87 -10.74 -1.49 1.19 6.47 
 (1.034) (1.319) (5.766) (3.269) (3.083) (10.556) (2.917) (5.381) (8.236) 
Obs. 101 84 28 101 84 28 101 84 32 
R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.62 0.58 0.62 0.78    
Note: The models are estimated by OLS, Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are 
used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. For the first panel dumav30, dumav3060 and dumav90, are 
binary dummy variables taking the value 1 if the average debt-to-GDP ratio of a particular country over the sample’s time span is below 30%, between 30 and 60% or 
above 90%, respectively. For the second panel, we also take the average value of the debt-to-GDP ration for each country as the threshold level, but now dumav60 refers 
to having that average ratio above 60%. Fd, fbank, fstock, feff, fsize and fbond correspond to the first principal component of different financial related variables based on 
Levine’s publicly available database and they refer to Overal Financial development, Financial intermediary development, Stock market development, Financial 
efficiency development, Financial size development and Bond market development, respectively. For more detailed information do refer to the main text. Robust 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., 
tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. 
Time fixed effects were included. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 9: Growth accounting with government debt plus initial regressors, 5-year averages data – 
different estimation methods and samples 
Dependent 
Variable 

























Sample All OECD All OECD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 




-1.57 -0.27*** -1.88** -0.15 -0.95*** -
1.17*** 
0.20 
 (0.173) (0.727) (0.420) (0.724) (0.971) (0.000) (0.084) (0.706) (0.238) (0.124) (0.295) (1.409) 
iniedu -0.01 -0.01 -1.27 1.52* 1.41** -1.15 0.79*** 0.17 0.94 -0.27 -0.09 -3.67 
 (0.486) (0.462) (1.439) (0.896) (0.639) (0.000) (0.264) (0.236) (1.015) (0.478) (0.352) (3.554) 
iniinf -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.032) 
inigovsize -0.07 0.16 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.07* 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.07 
 (0.045) (0.106) (0.162) (0.054) (0.151) (0.000) (0.039) (0.092) (0.097) (0.041) (0.083) (0.094) 
inifindepth 0.64*** 2.62*** 2.87*** 0.53** 1.03 5.42 0.22* -0.21 0.44 0.21* 0.06 0.43 
 (0.219) (0.703) (1.080) (0.218) (0.615) (0.000) (0.131) (0.453) (0.680) (0.115) (0.358) (0.971) 
initrade -0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
bankcrisis 0.25 0.29 1.58** -0.06 0.18 -1.47 -0.55*** -0.07 -0.20 -0.43** -0.30** -0.43 
 (0.219) (0.182) (0.762) (0.222) (0.142) (0.000) (0.176) (0.167) (0.378) (0.179) (0.122) (0.707) 
govbal_gdp -0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.05** -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.049) (0.019) (0.021) (0.000) (0.028) (0.031) (0.049) (0.017) (0.019) (0.048) 
govdebt_gdp 0.00 0.01** 0.01 -0.00 0.01* -0.03 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
inigfcf 0.03** -0.03 0.06* -0.05* -0.11** -0.29 0.04*** 0.02 0.05 0.04*** 0.03 0.06 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.035) (0.027) (0.042) (0.000) (0.015) (0.023) (0.033) (0.011) (0.023) (0.036) 
Obs. 290 290 290 110 110 110 186 186 186 105 105 105 
R-squared 0.094 0.361  0.372 0.584  0.254 0.381  0.447 0.479  
Hansen (p-value)   0.709   1.000   0.972   1.000 
AB AR(1) (p-value)   0.001   0.075   0.591   0.665 
AB AR(2) (p-value)   0.157   0.590   0.163   0.960 
Note: The models are estimated by OLS, Within Fixed Effects (FE-within) and Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). For the latter method lagged regressors are 
used as suitable instruments. The dependent variable is either the growth rate of TFP or the growth rate of the capital stock per worker, as identified in the first row. 
Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, 
i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), 
respectively. Time fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** 
denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
Table 10: Growth equations with government debt– accounting for cross-sectional dependence, 5 




Estimation Driscoll Kraay robust estimator CCEP 
Sample OECD EURO OECD EURO OECD EURO OECD EURO OECD EURO OECD EURO 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 






-1.68 -2.63*** -2.42** -
6.05*** 
-8.43** 
 (0.241) (0.582) (0.174) (0.319) (0.267) (1.103) (0.543) (1.236) (0.505) (1.069) (1.506) (3.513) 
popgr -0.02 -0.58 -0.10 -0.77** -0.06 -1.47* -0.59** -1.91*** -0.60** -1.78*** -
2.78*** 
-3.39** 
 (0.198) (0.372) (0.188) (0.265) (0.114) (0.715) (0.280) (0.552) (0.255) (0.460) (0.730) (1.243) 
gfcf_gdp 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.043) 
secondary_enrol 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.13 0.06** 0.17 0.13*** 0.29*** 0.10*** 0.15** 0.34*** 0.40** 
 (0.026) (0.050) (0.028) (0.081) (0.025) (0.103) (0.042) (0.079) (0.037) (0.069) (0.076) (0.153) 
openness 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.035) 
govdebt_gdp -
0.01*** 
-0.00     -0.00 0.01     
 (0.002) (0.005)     (0.006) (0.011)     




    -0.02*** -0.04***   
   (0.006) (0.010)     (0.008) (0.012)   
debtavtermmat     0.01 0.15     0.33** 0.46* 
     (0.094) (0.128)     (0.150) (0.258) 
Obs. 217 109 210 105 93 45 217 109 210 105 93 45 
R-squared 0.20 0.23 0.29 0.41 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.40 0.28 0.48 0.46 0.49 
Note: The models are estimated with either Driscoll Kraay robust estimator or the Pesaran’s Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator (CCPE) to correct for the 
existence of cross-sectional dependence in the OECD an Euro-area groups of countries. The dependent variable is real GDPpc growth, as identified in the first row. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. A constant term has been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** 











Table 11: “Above” and “below” average growth performers, government debt and budget deficits: 
All sample (debt-based equation) 




Budget deficit (-) or 
Surplus (+) 
(%GDP) 
Bottom Performers:    
Kiribati -5.1 16.1  
Guyana -2.9 58.2 -23.9 
Kuwait -2.6 72.0 0.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -2.3 138.6 -5.9 
Haiti -2.2 56.9 -2.9 
Suriname -2.0 20.9 -8.3 
Jamaica -1.6 70.8 -10.0 
Zambia -1.6 60.6 -8.8 
Georgia -1.6 38.2 -0.8 
Guinea-Bissau -1.6 216.0 -0.3 
Nicaragua -1.4 48.7 -6.8 
Niger -1.3 65.5 2.7 
Madagascar -1.3 87.9 -3.3 
Brunei Darussalam -1.3 94.3  
Senegal -1.3 25.0 -2.5 
Australia -1.2 24.2 -0.8 
Bolivia -1.2 34.5 -1.7 
Ghana -1.1 55.5 -4.6 
Top Performers:    
Oman 5.1 65.0 -6.1 
Botswana 4.0 56.5 12.0 
Korea, Rep. 2.9 35.4 -0.2 
China 2.8 27.4 -2.0 
Dominican Republic 1.9 51.3 -0.7 
Thailand 1.8 37.6 -1.4 
Malaysia 1.8 59.9 -4.3 
Malta 1.7 63.1 -2.4 
Pakistan 1.6 58.7 -6.4 
Cyprus 1.6 24.3 -5.4 
Israel 1.2 72.8 -8.1 
Saudi Arabia 1.2 52.8  
Indonesia 1.1 31.2 -1.3 
Ireland 1.1 43.5 -4.9 
Costa Rica 1.0 76.8 -2.2 
Guatemala 1.0 103.2 -1.7 
Belize 1.0 49.5 -3.6 
Swaziland 1.0 53.8 -2.8 
Japan 1.0 88.5 -4.0 
Note: see text for definition of “Bottom Performers” and “Top Performers”. Countries that do not fall in either of the two groups are excluded. Gross domestic product 
residuals are based on an OLS regression of GDPpc growth rate on initial GDPpc, population growth, secondary school enrolment, private investment, openness and 





Figure 1: Scatter plots of real GDPpc growth, and TFP, against the ratio of Government Debt 
































































































Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Figure 4: “Above” and below” average performers (in terms of individual country-specific 
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Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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